Introductio­n Kupu whakataki

In considering such questions, we are aware of the huge advantage we have over those responding to the pandemic in 2020–2022, rapidly, under huge pressure and often with scant information. Unlike them, we have the wisdom of hindsight. The decisions and measures we are scrutinising now reflect the circumstances and pressures of that particular and extraordinary time. We cannot be certain what other decisions might have been made if people had known more about the virus then, if COVID-19 had reached us earlier or if it had evolved differently. But we have looked for evidence that decision-makers were actively considering what scenarios might unfold and how to respond if they did. The conclusions we reach about the pandemic response reflect this expectation.

Because this section aims to support our lessons for the future and our recommendations, it provides a focused and selective account of preparations for, response to and recovery from the pandemic.

It is not a comprehensive day-by-day chronicle of Aotearoa New Zealand’s experience. As required by our terms of reference, we have drawn on but do not duplicate the many comprehensive reports and chronologies already produced by government agencies, reviewers, independent researchers and others.1 Nor is this section a forensic examination of every decision and development made between February 2020 and October 2022. Instead, it addresses those aspects of the response that proved most challenging, had the biggest impact, can be most feasibly tackled by Government – and, crucially, that offer the biggest opportunities for learning as we look to the future.

‘Looking Back’ begins with a brief, largely visual snapshot of some of the key pandemic events, impacts, decisions and outcomes Aotearoa New Zealand experienced and how they compared with other countries. The eight chapters that follow each address a different aspect of the pandemic response in detail: the all-of-government response (Chapter 2), lockdowns (Chapter 3), border and quarantine measures (Chapter 4), the health system response (Chapter 5), economic and social measures and impacts (Chapter 6), vaccination (Chapter 7) and finally the use of mandatory measures (Chapter 8). Each chapter follows a broadly consistent pattern: we begin by describing ‘what happened’, usually in a broadly chronological sequence and with little evaluative commentary. Short ‘spotlights’ feature throughout, highlighting particular pandemic policies or measures and their impacts. We then set out our assessment of that particular topic, summarising our major learnings from the pandemic at the end of each chapter. Finally, Chapter 9 takes stock of New Zealand’s pandemic response overall and sets out some broad reflections on what the country’s experience of COVID-19 taught us.

While the use of topic-specific chapters imposes a degree of order on our subject matter, in reality the many elements of the response cannot be readily separated into discrete strands. In a pandemic, everything affects everything else. It is impossible to consider lockdowns without also talking about education and mental health, for example, or vaccine mandates without also mentioning unemployment and social cohesion. As a result, there are inevitable and necessary overlaps between the chapters. Particular themes – te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations, the steadfastness of communities, economic consequences and, crucially, COVID-19’s human impacts – resurface in each. This reflects the unique nature of the period we have examined: the COVID-19 pandemic was truly an ‘everything, everywhere’ event for this country and the world.

A reminder about our use of evidence in this section:

In Part One, we described the breadth and depth of the evidence provided to us and the range of sources it came from – official records, independent reviews and reports, academic studies, and engagements with senior officials and decision-makers, iwi leaders, community groups, experts in disciplines like economics and public health, and members of the public.

This section is founded in a thorough and careful analysis of information relevant to our terms of reference.

From the start, and as our terms of reference envisaged, we knew that everyone who shared information or experiences with us needed to do so freely and frankly, and without fear of repercussion. This would allow us to get the fullest picture of what happened in the pandemic response, and to draw out useful lessons as efficiently as possible. We therefore agreed to certain confidentiality arrangements (summarised under ‘How we gathered and used evidence’ in Part One of this report).ⁱ

As a result of these arrangements, much of the non-public evidence which was provided to the Inquiry and informs our analysis is not cited in the chapters that follow – unless we sought and received permission from the source to quote from or otherwise identify their evidence. Likewise, statements or views are not attributed to specific organisations or individuals except with their agreement. Publicly-available sources are cited.

In sum, this section is founded in a thorough and careful analysis of information relevant to our terms of reference. As outlined in the discussion of our methodology in Part One, we have followed a robust process – weighing, assessing and cross-checking the evidence, testing our assumptions and considering the many possible counter-factual scenarios. As a result, we are confident that all our lessons and recommendations are soundly based.