8.6 Controversy over compulsory measures Te wenerau mō ngā whakaritenga whakahauanga

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the use of mandates and orders to make various public health measures compulsory under certain circumstances were among the most controversial aspects of the COVID-19 response, in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere – particularly vaccination requirements.

In this final section, we depart from our standard ‘What Happened’ and ‘Outcomes and Impacts’ format and take a step back to consider how this controversy played out over the course of the pandemic, culminating in the 28-day occupation of Parliament grounds by a broad coalition of anti-mandate protestors in early 2022.

Dramatic images from those events – and in particular the scenes that unfolded on 2 March 2022 during the Police operation to end the protest – remain etched in the minds of many people almost three years later. Many of our public submitters expressed concern about the protest, the divisions that emerged between many people over COVID-19-related matters, and the potential long-term consequences of these. While the full legacy of these events will not be known for some time, we offer some reflections on them here.

The use of mandates and other compulsory public health measures were among the most controversial aspects of the COVID-19 response.

8.6.1 The Parliamentary occupation

8.6.1.1 Protest activity began to cohere from mid-2021 around mandatory COVID-19 response measures

Opposition and disquiet about elements of the response had been present throughout the pandemic, but began to cohere from about mid-2021 in the second half of the year. Several groups formed to organise protest activities focused on aspects of the Government’s response:

• The Freedom Alliance was a coalition of Wellington-based groups that believed ‘the Government’s COVID-9 response was never designed to protect the health of New Zealanders, but rather to push a global political agenda’.¹⁹⁴ It carried out protest activity focused on use of mandates in the COVID-19 response.
• The Freedom and Rights Coalition formed in September 2021 in response to perceived government ‘overreach’ in the COVID-19 response. It began to organise protest actions around the country from October 2021.
• Voices for Freedom, a not-for-profit advocacy organisation, was founded in December 2020, focused on the view that ‘all freedoms (were) under attack from an overzealous and oppressive Covid-19 response’ (particularly freedom of speech and health and medical freedom).¹⁹⁵

8.6.1.2 A ‘Freedom Convoy’ converged on Parliament on 8 February 2022

In late January 2022, a ‘Freedom Convoy’ formed in Canada in opposition to vaccination mandates and other aspects of the Canadian government’s COVID-19 response. This protest attracted considerable international attention and emulation.

On 29 January 2022, a ‘Convoy 2022 NZ’ Facebook page was created. It proposed a New Zealand-based protest convoy, modelled on the Canadian one, with the following objectives:

• ‘Stop all mandates and end all COVID-19 imposed restrictions,
• Reverse COVID-19 introduced legislation and cease proposed legislation,
• The immediate restoration of our universal inalienable human rights,
• Medical professionals to follow the Principals [sic] in the NZMA Code of Ethics, and
• All media to have freedom without censorship.’

In the first week of February, the New Zealand Police became aware of a plan for two convoys – one from Cape Rēinga and one from Bluff – to converge in Wellington, culminating in a potential occupation at Parliament.¹⁹⁶ The two convoys set out on Sunday 6 February 2022 – Waitangi Day.¹⁹⁷

The ‘Freedom Convoy’ arrived at Parliament on Tuesday 8 February 2022. More than 150 convoy vehicles blocked streets around Parliament and approximately 2,000 protestors had assembled on Parliament grounds by midafternoon. More than 50 tents were erected that day on Parliament’s lawn. Parliament’s Speaker, Trevor Mallard, asked for Police assistance to remove these, but was advised that Police did not have the resources available to take enforcement action that evening. Around 500 protestors stayed on Parliament grounds overnight.¹⁹⁸

8.6.1.3 Initial attempts to disperse the protestors were unsuccessful

The occupation lasted 23 days, attracting a range of people with diverse views that loosely coalesced around a distrust of government. Protestors blockaded the surrounding area with their vehicles and covered Parliament lawn with tents, portaloos, and other temporary structures. At peak times, there were up to 3,000 people in attendance – the highest estimated day being Monday 14 February. Because there were so many people, the occupation spread beyond Parliament grounds to cover a large part of the surrounding Thorndon and Pipitea areas, and some also camped on private property such as the driveways and gardens of nearby homes.¹⁹⁹

In the first few days, the Speaker, Parliamentary security, and Police attempted to disperse the protestors. On 9 February, Speaker Trevor Mallard asked for Police to accompany Parliamentary staff to issue trespass notices to protestors, but they were only able to approach three tents before Police assessed that the situation had become unsafe.²⁰⁰ The next day, on 10 February, he officially closed Parliament grounds, and loudspeaker announcements informed protestors that they must leave. One hundred and fifty Police officers were deployed to enforce this, and made more than 100 arrests, but the next morning a second wave of protestors arrived, including more children and young people. That night, the Speaker activated Parliament’s lawn sprinklers and played music and COVID-19 vaccination messages over a loudspeaker until 10pm in an attempt to disperse the protestors. This was done against Police advice.²⁰¹

A severe weather event – Cyclone Dovi – hit Wellington on 12 February. Protestors dug trenches and laid out straw to deal with the combination of rain and sprinklers. They arranged security, a medical tent and food distribution, forced open the gates of Parliament, and cut power to the electronic bollards that had been preventing vehicle access to the grounds themselves.²⁰²

At the end of the first week of occupation, six protest groups associated with the occupation^xvi sent a letter to ministers outlining their objective:

“Until the end of the mandates, participants are determined to maintain their presence.”²⁰³

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern refused the letter’s request ‘for an urgent meeting with senior cabinet ministers to start a conversation’, pointing out that some of their signs called for the ‘death of politicians.’²⁰⁴ She solidified this position on 16 February when she formally advised the Police Commissioner that she would not meet or engage with the protestors.²⁰⁵ While some other politicians did engage with protestors at this time, a few days later on 17 February, leaders of all the Parliamentary political parties signed a statement indicating that they would not engage further with the protestors until they stopped breaking the law.²⁰⁶

8.6.1.4 Significant Police resource was required to manage and contain the protest

Throughout the 23-day occupation, significant Police resource was required to manage – and ultimately disperse – the protest.

On 13 February, a specialist Police negotiation team started work to liaise with the protestors. At that stage, around 200–300 protestors remained, amid torrential rain and gale-force winds.²⁰⁷ Numbers surged again early in the second week of the occupation. On 15 February, Police began a national operation to respond to the protest, establishing a Major Operations Centre to support the Wellington District’s local response.²⁰⁸

Police presence peaked in the weekend of 19–20 February, when 600 officers were rostered on in three shifts over a 48-hour period, with 200 more on standby. Around this time, an increased gang presence was observed at the occupation. Also at this time, Police officers who had been deployed at the protest began to test positive for COVID-19. Police were now of the view that de-escalation was the only safe way to deal with the protest.²⁰⁹ On 21 February they began a two-day workshop to plan a response to end the occupation.²¹⁰

8.6.1.5 City leaders, Police, mana whenua, and the Human Rights Commission met with protestors to hear their concerns

On 22 February, the Chief Human Rights Commissioner met with several protest group leaders to listen to their concerns and discuss ‘rights and responsibilities’. The next day, the Mayor of Wellington and Deputy Police Commissioner also met with several protestors.²¹¹

On 23 February, some protestors forced entry to nearby Pipitea Marae and attempted to ‘trespass’ tangata whenua there. On 24 February the Deputy Police Commissioner again met with protestors at the marae, along with two church leaders, to try to reach a resolution.²¹²

There was increasing sickness among protestors, as the conditions in the encampment became increasingly unsanitary, with reports of sewage from portaloos being discharged directly into stormwater drains. On 23 February, a confirmed COVID-19 case was reported among protestors for the first time. By 24 February, Police had serious concerns for the health and wellbeing of about 30 children at the protest.²¹³ They were also observing increased discord between different groups of protestors.²¹⁴

On Monday 28 February, Taranaki Whānui ki Te Upoko o Te Ika led a dawn ceremony at Pipitea Marae to deliver a unified message from North Island iwi condemning the aggressive and violent behaviour of some protestors.

Significant numbers of protestors, tents and structures, and vehicles remained in place up to the end of the protest.

8.6.1.6 On Wednesday 2 March 2022, Police undertook a large-scale operation to end the protest

Early in the morning of Wednesday 2 March 2022, Police began a large-scale operation to clear protestors, vehicles and structures from the protest site. This was brought forward by one day due to concerns about available Police resource (including having many officers unwell with COVID-19).²¹⁵ The graduation of recently trained Police officers was brought forward by several days to enable the new recruits to be deployed in the operation.²¹⁶

In total, around 600 officers were involved.²¹⁷ Starting at the outer edges of the occupation, they worked progressively to remove vehicles, arrest protestors, and establish a progressively tighter Police line around the core location of Parliament grounds itself.

The operation was successful, but dramatic and volatile scenes played out over the course of the day and late into that evening. There were many instances of violence. Protestors lit fires, set explosives, and used bricks and fire extinguishers as weapons against Police.²¹⁸ The slide in Parliament’s relatively new playground was burnt down.²¹⁹

By 10pm, Police had established a cordon close to Parliament. Around 40 protestors remained, and about 40 officers held the line into the early hours of the morning. The remaining protestors either dispersed or were arrested. In total Police made 95 arrests on 2 March, predominantly for trespass and obstruction, and later charged 54 more people after further investigation.²²⁰ Ambulance staff ended up treating 82 Police officers for injuries and six required hospital treatment.²²¹ Some protestors and bystanders were also injured in the operation. An extensive clean-up operation began the next day. Public areas that had been cleared in the operation, particularly Parliament grounds, were treated as a crime scene.²²²

8.6.2 Impacts of opposition on trust in institutions and social cohesion

The occupation of Parliament grounds – prompted by disaffection over the introduction of vaccine mandates (and to some extent, other pandemic measures), combined with the increasing circulation of false and misleading information about the pandemic and response – was perhaps the most visible expression of the pandemic’s impact on social cohesion and trust. However, the challenges to trust, social licence and social cohesion were recognised by some senior decision-makers from at least the second half of 2021.

During a pandemic, high levels of social cohesion support greater social licence for action, effective community-led responses, and are associated with lower infection and death rates.²²³ Conversely, pandemics can also damage social cohesion and trust in ways that – at their most extreme – threaten the rule of law, public safety and provision of essential services.²²⁴ This meant social cohesion and licence were salient factors for decision-makers when considering whether to implement mandatory measures. While the purpose of such measures was to increase the uptake and effectiveness of public health measures like vaccination, contact tracing and masking, use of mandates could actually undermine these goals if they resulted in decreased trust in government or eroded goodwill for the response.

Many public submitters and stakeholders we engaged with felt that aspects of the pandemic response – particularly mandatory measures – had damaged social cohesion. We heard, for example, about breakdowns of personal, family/whānau, community and employment relationships over vaccine mandates and vaccination status, and increased public anxiety, antisocial behaviour, stress and violence.²²⁵ The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has also reflected that the damage to social cohesion and spread of misinformation and disinformation during the pandemic may have impacted the effectiveness of the public health response over time.²²⁶

Looking to the future, many stakeholders commented that the loss of social licence and breakdown of social cohesion that occurred during this pandemic may shape how the population is likely to respond to public health responses like lockdowns and vaccine requirements in any future pandemics. Some stakeholders also reported increased hesitancy about non-COVID-19 vaccines, consistent with evolving international research.²²⁷

The evidence we heard from experts on the role of misinformation and disinformation was mixed. While agreeing that misinformation and disinformation are a significant global issue which the pandemic has exacerbated, experts we engaged with differed on the extent to which they saw it as an ongoing risk to trust and social cohesion. Some thought Aotearoa New Zealand had largely reverted to pre-pandemic trust levels, while others were more concerned that trust levels would continue to decline.

Regardless, all agreed that misinformation and disinformation present an increasing global challenge, and that those who are already marginalised and with low trust in government (including Māori) are most susceptible. This evidence, as well as reports by multiple government agencies, supports a continued focus on the risk of misinformation and disinformation. Repairing, fostering and maintaining trust and social cohesion will be key to both countering the impacts of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation, and ensuring Aotearoa New Zealand is in a good position to respond effectively to a future pandemic.

Repairing, fostering and maintaining trust and social cohesion will be key to ensuring Aotearoa New Zealand is in a good position to respond effectively to a future pandemic.