Main Report

2.6 Our assessment Tā mātau arotake: rautaki, mana whakahaere, whakatautikanga me te tuku whakamōhio

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Sections 2.1–2.5 have described the evolution of the COVID-19 response strategies that the government pursued, and the governance arrangements, decision-making structures and communications tools used to develop and deliver them. We now turn to consider the utility and effectiveness of these elements of the all-of-government response.

2.6.1 Governance and decision-making: getting the model right

Finding the right structure for the all-of-government response to a rapidly-changing and highly unpredictable crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic was challenging. Throughout 2020, several governance and decision-making models were tried and replaced, or modified. While this showed commendable adaptability, as the Public Service Leadership Team noted, ‘it took longer than desired to stand-up enduring arrangements that would enable a strong all-of-government response beyond the ODESC and lead agency model’.87

We heard from numerous stakeholders that, up until the end of June 2020, there was confusion about the roles and responsibilities of agencies, oversight groups, teams, and governance bodies. Coordination across agencies was lacking, and while the goal of elimination was clearly established by April 2020, the specifics of how it would be achieved and the role agencies would play were less clear. Without a prior plan for setting up an all-of-government response structure (and instead relying on rapid reviews to identify gaps and ways of improving a bespoke operating model), some core elements were missing – such as a separate function focused entirely on developing forward-looking, longer-term cross sector strategy (see section 2.6.1.1 below).

Our evidence does not point to any single reason why it took a while to settle on a clear all-of-government strategy, coordination and governance function to lead the response. There was a desire to avoid unnecessary structural change when people were fully engaged in fighting the pandemic, and a wish to ensure such change was deliberate and informed by independent advice (namely, the two rapid reviews in April 202088 and October 202089). However, a compounding factor was also that alternatives to the lead agency model plus ODESC arrangement – if a crisis demanded a response that was well beyond the remit of a single agency – had not been considered or prepared for before COVID-19. We note that the United Kingdom COVID-19 Inquiry report on resilience and preparedness also came to similar conclusions. It found that the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience was ‘not appropriate’.90 While the United Kingdom inquiry recommended the lead agency model be abolished, we do not agree with this in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. There are situations where the scale and nature of an emergency may be appropriate for a lead agency model. Rather, we support something more like the approach taken in the recently-revised Australia Government Crisis Management Framework: it retains the lead agency model but recognises that whole-of-government coordination is necessary when dealing with crises that have extreme to catastrophic impact or complexity.91

2.6.1.1 The need for a separate strategy function

Best practice in emergency management is to establish a separate strategy function in the early days of a crisis, thereby ensuring a focus on longer-term recovery that is separate from the day-to-day aspects of the response itself. The strategy function’s role is to focus on the future (including playing out the current scenario, likely other scenarios, and the best response to these) and look towards an exit from the response or the establishment of a ‘new normal’.

Despite attempts, a broader, integrated, long-term strategic planning approach never got underway satisfactorily during New Zealand’s response to COVID-19. On paper the first bespoke structure put in place during the response (see Figure 4) included a ‘strategy and policy’ function. However, we heard that it was impossible for those involved to look more than a few weeks ahead, even though they wanted to do so, because the more immediate demands of the policy response understandably consumed their focus. This was reflected in the priorities of senior leaders, who were expected to concentrate on delivering the immediate response in the context of a changing environment and new emerging issues. Some senior ministers and officials that we spoke to were aware of this challenge, recalling their absorption in the operational details of the response and the struggle to find the time and space to look beyond these immediate priorities.

The early reviews of the all-of-government response also highlighted the absence of, and need for, a separate strategy function. The second rapid review,92 in October 2020, recommended that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s COVID-19 Group develop a medium-term strategy and work programme for Cabinet’s consideration. The strategy function was eventually given to the COVID-19 Group. But it did not have the mandate to look beyond the elimination strategy to what might come next: rather, it was limited to ‘coordinat[ing] an integrated strategic agenda across government, based on the elimination strategy framework’.93

The creation of the Red Team within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was an attempt to create space for alternative thinking.xvii Charged with scrutinising and challenging the all-of-government response to the resurgence of COVID-19 in August 2020, it remained in place for four weeks. Senior officials who were there at the time told us that the Red Team struggled to fulfil this function due to a focus on operational concerns. Others suggested that the team might have made more of an impact if it had included more members from outside government. Regardless, there was agreement that a scrutiny mechanism is an important but tricky function to put in place. It needs to be both close enough to the response to understand the challenges, but not too involved to be captured or unable to maintain independence. In this instance, further work was needed to implement this function well, but it did not eventuate.

Other evidence we gathered (through interviews with senior officials, and examination of minutes of meetings and advice to ministers) also suggested that consistent strategic governance remained elusive throughout the response, despite the best efforts of ministers and officials. A range of different mechanisms were tried to provide this strategic oversight – the Quin, the National Response Leadership Team,xviii and finally the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board established in November 2020 – and met with some limited success. For example, the terms of reference of the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board included providing system leadership as New Zealand navigated the COVID-19 pandemic over the next two to three years.94 However, meeting minutes show that the Board spent most of its time focusing on operational detail and coordination rather than system leadership.95 Possible reasons suggested for this emphasis included the composition of the Board (many members were experienced in operational delivery), the Board’s limited accountability, a focus on addressing the 1,000 plus recommendations from the many reviews related to the response, timing and commissioning. This is not to say that no one was ‘doing strategy’ across government. Indeed, officials told the Inquiry about strategic work they were involved in, and there is evidence in Cabinet papers that individual agencies gave advice with a broad focus that included consideration of what was coming next. However, this thinking was happening in discrete areas and was not always connected across agencies or sectors.

The Inquiry heard from multiple sources (including ministers, senior officials, external advisors to Government and the public) that the response was ultimately affected by the lack of a protected space for long-term, integrated strategic planning. This gap was described in phrases such as ‘no one was thinking about how we would get off the horse’ and ‘everyone was on the dance floor and there was no one on the balcony, looking down at what was happening’.

We also heard differing accounts from ministers and officials as to why there was a lack of connected advice on long-term strategy. Whatever the cause, our view is that the presence of a dedicated, centralised strategic function with appropriate capacity would have helped provide clarity in driving, and delivering, strategic advice and longer-term planning.

“No one was thinking about how we would get off the horse ..... everyone was on the dance floor and there was no one on the balcony, looking down at what was happening.”

2.6.1.2 Coordinating advice to decision-makers and ensuring a range of perspectives

Among its other constraints, the lead agency plus ODESC model was not well suited for providing decision-makers with coordinated advice from different agencies. Even the all-of-government governance structure eventually adopted did not fully resolve the challenges of ensuring multiple perspectives were reflected in the advice provided.

Early on in the response, Cabinet appropriately recognised that while they were facing a public health emergency, that was not all: any actions they took to curb transmission and save lives would also have significant social and economic implications.96 However, they recognised that these actions were also the best response in the initial stages – not only for public health reasons, but to minimise the economic and social costs. As the Minister of Finance, Grant Robertson, told Parliament on 17 March 2020: ‘Our first response is a public health one. It is our fundamental duty. It is also the first and best economic response.’97

There were requirements for health and non-health factors (such as economic, social, impacts on population groups, operational) to be considered in response decision-making.98 For example, the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 required consideration of whether COVID-19 orders were appropriate and proportionate.99 Advice from other agencies (such as the Treasury or operational agencies) was included in papers to Cabinet, but we were told that the public health advice remained ‘front and centre’. On the whole, over the period when the elimination strategy and its zero transmission goal were guiding the response, public health advice and the health risks associated with COVID-19 were the primary driver of decision-making.100 In the context of a health pandemic, the centrality of health advice early on to ensure we avoided the health system being overwhelmed and rates of deaths as experienced in other jurisdictions, was appropriate.

A review by an independent advisory body in September 2020 identified that this focus presented problems over time:

“Too often decision-making papers have gone to Cabinet with little or no real analysis of options and little evidence of input from outside health or even from different parts of the health Ministry or sector. While this may have been understandable in the first weeks of the response it should not be continuing eight months into an issue as we are currently facing.” 101

Over time, a wider range of advice was incorporated in Cabinet papers, including advice on the impact of options on specific population groups,102 as well as more comprehensive advice on economic and social impacts and considerations. However, the range of advice remained variable. We heard from a senior Minister, Members of Parliament and senior officials that a focus on health perspectives continued throughout the response. For example, we were told that before and during the 2021 Delta outbreak, ‘Cabinet papers were coming in as DPMC papers, but really were Health papers, and we were bolting on Treasury and social advice.’

Senior officials we met with said both process and cultural factors probably partly accounted for the emphasis on health considerations (over others) in the decision-making process. The Inquiry was consistently told by officials that key policies were developed by a small group of decision-makers and advisers, with little scope for broader input. We also heard that administrative processes also meant health advice was prioritised, particularly in the early days. For instance, the Ministry of Health provided its input to Cabinet papers last so that the information was as up-to-date as possible; however, this meant other agencies were unable to offer their own perspectives based on the latest information. While the situation improved over time, the timing and input to Cabinet advice remained a challenge for operational agencies – who were managing the complexities of implementing health orders at pace across very complex systems and sectors – throughout most of the response.

Other senior officials (both from all-of-government and from the Ministry of Health) talked about agency culture challenges, which likely prevented more holistic advice being developed and may have inhibited greater coordination between agencies. This challenge was also mentioned by some external commentators. Several stakeholders described the early stages of the response as being hampered by a lack of cultural alignment between officials from an ‘emergency response’ background and senior health officials, who struggled to align a ‘command and control’ framework with a complex and highly devolved health system. This was exacerbated by a common perception that health officials were reluctant to accept outside advice or input, or to share responsibility with other agencies.

To some extent, this was also a structural problem arising from the reliance on a health-led pandemic response to weigh up all the impacts decisions might have – especially when there were significant information gaps, including real-time data and situational reporting.

The range of advice available had consequences for decision-makers. One senior Minister told us that, without broader advice that took account of wider considerations beyond health objectives, they felt ill-equipped to make any decision not recommended by health experts. This is not to say that advice on the broader impacts was never given, but it was not consistent or prioritised.

One of the reasons this is problematic is that many of the decisions made during the response required significant trade-offs and compromises. This was problematic for several reasons. For one, they required Cabinet to weigh up the impact of a decision (on a matter such as regional lockdowns or vaccine exemptions) on health outcomes, on different population groups, on human rights and treaty obligations and on the economy, not to mention on the need to maintain ongoing social licence. Weighing up so many different impacts required robust advice from a range of agencies and perspectives. In our view, some decisions made in the COVID-19 response had unintended consequences that might have been prevented or mitigated had wider advice been given and acted upon (such as employer vaccine requirements and vaccine passports).

At a practical level, the Inquiry received evidence about many occasions where policy decisions with operational implications were made with limited advice from non-health agencies. As a result, significant implementation or enforcement challenges emerged – examples described elsewhere in the Looking Back chapters include the rapid imposition of regional boundaries, aspects of mask wearing and other personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements (such as requiring children in early childhood education to wear facemasks) and workplace distancing. When implementation or enforcement problems were encountered, it led to delays, rework and people on the ground having to come up with their own workarounds.

That the response’s primary focus remained on COVID-19 health outcomes may also have contributed to the system’s blind spot when it came to how the response would evolve over time (see previous section). It was certainly reflected in an ongoing tendency for decisions to be made on the basis of a ‘zero risk’ approach – in other words, always opting for the option with the lowest possible risk of COVID-19 transmission, even if the other costs of so doing might be high.

2.6.1.3 Maintaining quality control and consultation processes in a crisis and beyond

Early in the response, speed was paramount. Cabinet and ministers needed to make complex decisions and relied on officials to provide sound advice, at pace in an environment where information (about the COVID-19 virus and the response of the rest of the world) was changing hourly. Many innovative and adaptive techniques were used to enable this: ministers and senior officials alike told us how effective it was having the right people in the room around a whiteboard. However, the urgent circumstances meant some long-established practices – intended to ensure that advice to Cabinet is robust, high quality, considers a full range of options and has input from a range of perspectives or relevant stakeholders – had to be temporarily suspended.

As with other departures from usual practice during the pandemic, this was justified at the beginning of the response. But the balance should have then shifted back towards more normal practices – albeit recognising there would still be occasions where urgency was essential. However, the nature of the evolving pandemic meant that some aspects of good practice were not reestablished as the ‘default’ for a long time. For example, requirements for regulatory impact statements for COVID-19-related matters were not reestablished until early 2022. Likewise, the time to consult on changes to COVID-19 orders was often very limited.xix

Many standard government decision-making processes are designed to ensure an appropriately broad range of inputs are included in advice, so there are risks in retaining the ‘emergency approach’ for too long. A senior Minister and several senior officials told the Inquiry about the appealing sense of freedom and empowerment that came from having permission to move quickly and suspend normal processes. But while limiting consultation and engagement sped up decision-making, it also increased the risk of ‘groupthink’, a lack of critical review and full consideration of operational impacts.

The Inquiry heard of many areas where outcomes could have been improved (sometimes significantly) had broader perspectives been sought or considered: among them were the establishment of regional boundaries, the drafting of legislation and regulations, implementation of PPE requirements, and the vaccine rollout (all covered in more detail elsewhere in this report). However, the Inquiry also heard that despite reasonable periods set aside for consultation and engagement – for example, with regional groups to map regional boundaries as part of resurgence planning – decisions ultimately had to be implemented more quickly than anticipated.

We saw some evidence of efforts being made to bring in broader perspectives. Advisory groups were established to give ministers opportunities to engage with particular key stakeholders or seek specific expertise to inform decisions. They included the Business Advisory Council, the Strategic COVID-19 Public Health Advisory Group, and the Community Panel.103 Likewise, some elements of good practice were retained throughout the pandemic response, including efforts to provide transparency in decision-making. Cabinet papers were routinely releasedxx and agencies were required to continue to meet all their normal obligations under the Official Information Act 1982.

2.6.1.4 Looking after the public service workforce

The Inquiry heard many stories about the efforts of individuals across the public service whose innovation and dedication enabled the delivery of New Zealand’s response, often at great personal cost. This enormous effort has been well recognised – both nationally and internationally. Reviews of the initial phase reflected on the public service’s role in building a strong foundation for New Zealand’s COVID-19 response:

“The nature of the challenge, its rapid and silent spread and the compressed timeframes within which officials and decision makers were required to operate is unprecedented in modern times…… The urgency, pressure, and timeframes within which people were operating was extraordinary. Overlaying that was an absence of a credible precedent to follow……nothing of this scale globally and or domestically had been experienced.”104

“Many public servants worked extraordinary hours in extraordinary circumstances to help keep New Zealanders safe and to mitigate the pandemic’s other impacts. Officials were resourceful and showed initiative. They faced a complex task, prolonged uncertainty, and constant pressure. The ability of public servants to work together under significant stress was, and continues to be, critical to the success of the response.” 105

However, given the pace of change and the significant uncertainty officials had to deal with throughout the response, it was inevitable that workforce challenges also surfaced. For example, recruitment and retention to service the communications response was challenging. Chief executives of government agencies were reportedly sometimes reluctant to release staff to the central unit and there was no requirement for them to do so. Some other areas of the all-of-government response also struggled to access staff with the skillsets they needed. Others had staff cycle in and out for short periods of time – sometimes as little as six weeks.

We heard often about the immense and unrelenting pressure on many public servants. Working conditions were extremely challenging, requiring staff to operate on an ‘emergency’ footing for sustained periods. Burnout was common, and we heard from some who were part of the effort that they would not volunteer to repeat the experience.

2.6.2 Pandemic strategy: positive outcomes, challenging transitions

2.6.2.1 The success of the elimination strategy

From April 2020 until October 2021, Aotearoa New Zealand’s COVID-19 response was guided by the strategic goal of elimination. During most of this period the pandemic response was widely viewed as coherent and effective, with a clear sense of the overall public health goal and the actions needed to support it. This clarity of purpose sustained the coordinated effort of the many individuals, whānau, iwi, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), councils, agencies and businesses that mobilised to protect the health of their communities. New Zealand was widely praised internationally for having one of the strongest responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.106

The initial Alert Level System was an innovative communication and policy tool that proved highly effective in supporting widespread compliance with public health restrictions. It was developed by a team of dedicated officials working at pace. The system drew on established infection control tools, but presented these in a simple and coherent way. It provided an effective means of communicating the risk level posed by the outbreak and the measures required under each level.

During this period, public health and social measures were employed with a clear focus on preventing and eliminating transmission of COVID-19 within the New Zealand population. Strict border controls and quarantine of incoming travellers were in place to prevent entry of the virus into New Zealand, and domestic infection control measures were organised into a settings-based approach via the Alert Level System and used to eliminate any chains of COVID-19 transmission that did make it past the border (although it struggled with Delta in Auckland).

This combination of border controls and domestic alert level settings was effective in achieving the strategic goal of elimination. Community transmission was eliminated on 8 June 2020, and more than 100 days followed with no new cases. Small outbreaks in Auckland in August 2020 and February and March 2021 prompted Cabinet to return Auckland to Alert Level 3 lockdown several times (see Chapter 3). These initial regional lockdowns were relatively brief, lasting between a few days and two weeks, and the package of measures (the regional lockdown, intensive contact-tracing, testing, isolation and other targeted public health measures) were successful in eliminating community transmission, allowing a return to relatively normal conditions (compared with the substantial disruption being experienced elsewhere in the world).

The successful deployment of public health and social measures in service of the elimination strategy involved the coordinated effort of thousands of people around the country. Working together, individuals, whānau, hapū, iwi, NGOs, councils, agencies and businesses deployed infection control measures such as locally-led checkpoints, developing their own protocols for gatherings, tangihanga and funerals, and running or supporting vaccination clinics. These groups and organisations also distributed significant resources, food, equipment and other essentials to support communities and households to enable people to remain safe in lockdown or isolation as required (see Chapters 3, 6 and 7 for more detail).

Many public submissions to the Inquiry expressed support for the elimination approach, associating it with positive health outcomes, lesser economic impacts, feelings of safety, limited disruptions to daily life and protection of the health system from being overwhelmed.

“The elimination strategy worked and the country benefited from that in health outcomes as well as economically. NZ was able to carry on a normal life for 1.5 years thanks to that strategy while the rest of the world struggled, something too often forgotten now.”

Over time voices became less unanimous and there were growing calls to open Aotearoa New Zealand’s borders.107

2.6.2.2 The difficulties of moving on

At the beginning of the pandemic, the Government showed agility in its decision-making, adopting a strategy that was widely endorsed and contributed to good public health outcomes.108 Through a combination of prompt and bold early decision-making, and some fortunate timing and circumstances, by early April 2020 a clear strategy was in place, and a combination of measures including border closures and the Alert Level System were deployed effectively to support it.

However, despite the opportunity to regroup after this initial success, there was limited integrated, strategic planning as the pandemic progressed. As discussed in section 2.6.1.1, the Inquiry considers that this is partly attributable to the lack of a separate strategy function within the all-of-government response structure. There was comprehensive, cross-agency strategic planning in discrete areas (such as looking to vaccine procurement, resurgence planning, or safe reopening of the border). But once the elimination strategy was established and demonstrated to be effective, other options (including what would replace the elimination goal) received less timely consideration than they could have.

Between April 2020 and September 2021, the implicit assumption appears to have been that the elimination strategy would remain in place until population-level immunity could be achieved through vaccination. This assumption is evident in two key documents from 2020. The COVID-19 Health and Disability System Response Plan (prepared by the Ministry of Health in April 2020) noted that elimination would be pursued ‘until a vaccine becomes available to achieve population-level immunity’.109 A December 2020 report to the Minister for COVID-19 Response noted that ‘a vaccine will support a return to a new normal, [but] we need to continue our Elimination Strategy for the next six to twelve months’.110 However, neither document covers what would be involved in phasing out the elimination strategy, or what public health goal might replace elimination once high levels of vaccination were achieved.

In the following year (2021), the elimination strategy increasingly came to be seen as an enduring goal, rather than a time-limited phase linked to achieving population-wide vaccination. A May 2021 update prepared by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet considered how the COVID-19 response might be strengthened within the parameters of the existing elimination strategy. This report signalled that Aotearoa New Zealand would maintain its elimination strategy even once the border reopened, referring to ‘continuing to refine our Elimination Strategy whilst starting to rebuild contact with the world’.111

Government announcements over this time (e.g. ‘Reconnecting New Zealanders with the World’) saw coexistence of selectively re-opened borders as consistent with an elimination strategy – supported by a vaccinated population.112

When the tools supporting the elimination strategy were struggling to eliminate Auckland’s Delta outbreak starting August 2021, there was no ‘Plan B’ or threshold at which to move to suppression. While the Associate Minister of Health had sought advice from the Strategic COVID-19 Public Health Advisory Groupxxi back in June 2021 on whether there was a need to revisit the elimination strategy as the country moved to a highly vaccinated population, she had been told that retaining the elimination strategy at that point in time was the best approach (but that the strategy should be regularly reviewed).

“In our current view, the elimination strategy is still viable and, indeed, optimal as international travel resumes. It does not mean “Zero COVID”, but it does mean stamping out clusters of COVID-19 as they occur. The strategy should be reviewed regularly.” 113

The ‘breathing room’ created by the successful elimination of community transmission between June 2020 to August 2021 was in our view not used to best effect. The opportunity was missed to review the ongoing optimisation, then exit, of the elimination strategy, consider adaptation for potential new virus scenarios and adequately prepare other response options for changes in circumstances (including the cumulative and shifting impacts across health, social, wellbeing and economic outcomes). Although discussions on future strategic options were being canvassed during mid-2021, ultimately there was no agreed strategic plan on moving out of elimination until after the end of the elimination strategy had been publicly announced in October 2021.

It is important to note the context at the time – Delta was still the dominant strain in October 2021, and the world had not yet learnt about Omicron, with its much higher transmission rates (and therefore probably impossible to manage with an elimination strategy). Despite this, the lack of well-integrated advice on, and an agreed plan for, a post-elimination strategy is surprising. This is especially so given that the elimination goal was originally envisaged as a means of protecting the population until high levels of vaccination could be achieved.

The Inquiry heard that the early and widely recognised success of the elimination strategy may have made decision-makers reluctant to move on from a ‘zero risk [of viral transmission]’ approach to COVID-19. A firm commitment to the elimination strategy combined with the centrality of health-focused advice and public pressure meant that, for much of the COVID-19 response, decision-makers were strongly occupied with how to minimise the risk of viral transmission. The Inquiry was told that this tendency to prioritise lowering risk of viral transmission to as close to zero as possible made it difficult for officials to present options based on a more nuanced risk assessment, or for decision-makers to consider whether this approach to balancing health benefits and wider social and economic costs continued to be appropriate.

“The elimination strategy was a zero-risk strategy – I think this was good, but we didn’t concede defeat early enough. Once it was clear we wouldn’t get to zero [transmission in the Auckland Delta outbreak] we still tried to pursue something that looked like this. Should have pivoted sooner – i.e. we weren’t going to get Auckland back to zero [cases]. – a senior Government minister.”

The shift from elimination to suppression (‘minimisation and protection’) was a hugely challenging transition operationally. For example, where some future plans had been made – such as for a gradual re-opening of the border – they had been consistently positioned as taking place under an implicit scenario in which high vaccination could achieve something approaching herd immunity and it would be easy to keep stamping out small outbreaks. This was not the scenario that transpired.

The lack of integrated planning exacerbated operational challenges for agencies, businesses and communities. It also created confusion across government and the wider public on what the objectives of the new approach were, and their likely consequences. The lack of strategic clarity in the COVID-19 response at this time is well understood publicly and has been acknowledged by many involved. Honourable Chris Hipkins, who was the Minister for COVID-19 Response in late 2021, spoke frankly about this with us:

“There was no bump free pathway to get from elimination to life as normal – there was always going to be disruption on the way… We needed to have a group of people more removed and planning for the next steps – we had everyone focused on ‘right now’. We really needed to think beyond the horizon – we didn’t nail that.”

We heard similar comments from other senior ministers, and several have expressed such sentiments publicly, including Hon Chris Hipkins.114

This understanding was also reflected in the submissions we received. While numerous submitters expressed strong support for the elimination strategy as deployed early in the pandemic, many comments indicated a view that elimination became less viable as time went on.

“During the pandemic I felt that the government did the right thing by immediately closing the borders and putting us in lockdown. However, as time went on and other countries took different approaches to travel and movement, I felt NZ was very blinkered.”

People affected by the long lockdowns in Auckland in 2021 were particularly critical of the way the Government held on to the elimination goal without articulating an alternative.

“It seems in hindsight that the last Auckland lockdown was too long. People were pushed too far and became resentful and critical and soon forgot what had been avoided.”

Public submission to the Inquiry

There was also criticism of how quickly the approach changed once the elimination strategy was abandoned, leaving many – especially those with disabilities, chronic health conditions, and compromised immune systems – feeling vulnerable. This was exacerbated by the lack of signalling that New Zealand would need to phase out of the elimination strategy and consider how to live with COVID-19 in the community. It was not well understood or communicated that an elimination strategy was always going to be time-limited, and that high levels of infection might be an unavoidable part of the exit.

“As someone with a disabled wife, I felt severely neglected by the government when they chose to drop the elimination approach to COVID-19 without developing the proper infrastructure that would allow for us and the other disabled people we know to continue to participate in society at all.”

These challenges were by no means unique to Aotearoa New Zealand. Reviews of the COVID-19 response in other countries have highlighted similar challenges in trying to undertake long-term thinking and planning alongside the immediate pressures of responding to a national crisis. A review of the COVID-19 response in the Netherlands highlighted how difficult it was for the government to consider the ‘bigger picture’ and the possibility of a shift in approach given the demands of having to respond to a continually evolving situation while under intense political scrutiny regarding operational aspects of the pandemic response.115 An independent review of Australia’s response to COVID-19 noted that – despite their early success in responding to COVID-19 – governments (state and federal) were often slow to adapt to changing circumstances.116

2.6.3 Public communications

Communications and information are an essential lever of government in a crisis, particularly when the situation is novel or uncertain and where the public risks serious illness or loss of life, as was the case with the pandemic. The need for direct, clear and reassuring public communications was well-understood by those involved as a critical element of the pandemic response and was considered fundamental to the success achieved.

Public submissions to the Inquiry reinforced the value placed on good communication and clear information during an emergency and many endorsed the approach to public communications during the pandemic. Some submitters particularly noted the positive impact on social cohesion of the empathetic approach to public messages.

“The ‘be kind’ [message] and caring for the vulnerable rather than just business as usual was vital, with unexpected benefits of time spent getting to know neighbours and wider community better.”

During the elimination phase of the pandemic, public communications were highly effective at setting out what actions and behaviours were required by the public to help limit the spread of the disease, and in doing so appealing to collective values and harnessing the energy of individuals, households, whānau and communities behind the response. There was a tangible sense of solidarity among many communities during the first lockdown, and a high degree of compliance with its conditions.

Aspects of Aotearoa New Zealand’s approach were emulated by other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom’s adoption of an alert level system similar to New Zealand’s in May 2020. New Zealand’s ‘empathetic communication’ during the pandemic and the Prime Minister’s high degree of public engagement were highlighted as an example of best practice by the OECD in 2021.117 Public submissions to our Inquiry reinforced the value placed on good communication and clear information during an emergency and many endorsed the approach to public communications during the pandemic.

“Communication about what we needed to do, and why, was very clear and easy to follow.”

2.6.3.1 Establishing an all-of-government public communications function

The COVID-19 pandemic was an ‘everything, everywhere, all at once’ crisis requiring critical, accurate public information and communication on a wide range of topics and to a wide range of audiences at a previously uncontemplated scale. In this context, stakeholders agreed that it was appropriate for the provision of public information to be an all-of-government function led out of the National Crisis Management Centre (and subsequently the COVID-19 Group in Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet from July 2020), rather than by the lead agency.

Officials from the Ministry of Health told us that the newly devised structure served the early stages of the response well. It was seen as critical to ensuring that public information could be delivered at the scale and level of service required, and the physical location of the new team in the National Crisis Management Centre enabled close collaboration with those leading different parts of the response. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet told us that the value of the centralised COVID-19 public information function cannot be overstated and they saw it as an essential part of the overall success of the COVID-19 response.

There were teething problems with establishing a new communications function in the early stages of the pandemic. There was some initial confusion over the split of roles and responsibilities between the new all-of-government team and the Ministry of Health’s existing communications teams. Most of these were worked through relatively quickly with support from staff within the Prime Minister’s Office.

However, the fact that the All-of-Government Public Information Management Team did not have specific responsibility for community engagementxxii became an issue as the response moved beyond the early days of the pandemic.118 From March to May of 2020, public messages and channels had to be developed and deployed quickly in order to keep up with the constantly changing nature of the pandemic. There was limited opportunity for widespread community engagement. Efforts were made to ensure messages reached more diverse audiences such as work undertaken with Niche Mediaxxiii and, as the pandemic developed, other steps were taken to improve community engagement, including development of tailored resources, messaging and content for a range of audiences. However, it took too long to establish meaningful engagement with a wide range of communities, particularly with iwi and Māori. As a result, important public information was not always reaching everyone who needed it.

In their engagements with us, members of the all-of-government team recognised that they did not have the capacity to build the partnerships they needed for this aspect of the response, and acknowledged that it was a difficult time to engage with communities because the communities were busy responding to the challenges posed by the pandemic, including keeping their own people safe.

2.6.3.2 Increasing complexity and changing public sentiment

Public communications and messages early in the pandemic response were reasonably straightforward, and were able to be framed positively. This reflected the highly focused nature of the response at the time – while lockdown measures were drastic, the message that needed to be conveyed to the public was simple and easy to follow: ‘stay home, save lives’.

However, as time passed, government objectives shifted to gradually allowing people to resume ‘normal’ activity, with a range of restrictions and caveats to protect public health. This involved a raft of new policy settings that changed frequently and were more complex than the relatively blunt tools of the early lockdowns. The all-of-government communications team often had limited time to prepare to implement decisions that required rapid and clear public information.

As the pandemic wore on, people’s attitudes to the Government’s messages and policies also changed, and public messaging needed to evolve in response. Social research was used to understand and track this change in sentiment.

The empathetic messaging that was a strong feature of the Unite Against COVID-19 campaign and early communications response came to be seen by some people as condescending. Phrases such as ‘team of five million’ and ‘be kind’ were criticised by some public submitters to our Inquiry as patronising or even hypocritical when aspects of the response, such as long lockdowns in Auckland or the introduction of vaccine mandates, felt ‘unkind’ to some citizens. New Zealanders overseas also found the phrase grating and exclusive:

“I would echo this; the us and them division came from the top (team of 5 million vs. the “risks” overseas). The lottery made people feel like a number not a person. The amount of abuse I received was very entrenched in New Zealand (e.g. “you left this country, you don’t deserve to come back”).”

The time pressure and the nature of the single daily briefing also created challenges for members of the press. The briefings were a key opportunity for journalists to ask questions of the people in charge of the response. During lockdowns, attendance was limited, and only Wellington-based reporters could attend, so members of the Parliamentary press gallery often had long lists of questions on behalf of colleagues as well as themselves. The short timeframes, limited presenters and the livestream also created a difficult environment for journalists to ask questions that were technical or nuanced in nature.

It was previously unheard of for government press conferences to generate such high public viewership, and on occasion, individual journalists were subjected to public anger or criticism in response to their questions, sometimes because they were perceived to be too critical of decision-makers, and sometimes the opposite.

The combination of reasonably dispassionate health advice with a ‘political message of unity’ that senior press secretaries told us made the daily 1pm briefings successful may also have come to undermine their effectiveness. Some public submitters felt that having the Prime Minister and Director-General present the briefings together unduly politicised the information. This was commented on as particularly pertinent in the lead up to the 2020 General Election.

“Don’t grandstand on TV daily etc and make it all about the Government. It should be all about the recommendations of an expert apolitical medical panel.”

2.6.4 Diverse communications for diverse audiences?

The lack of ethnic diversity amongst the key spokespeople at the 1pm podium was seen as problematic for some communities we spoke with. Failing to reflect the diversity of New Zealand’s demographics became an issue for communities, and in turn whether or not they felt included in ‘the team of five million’.

Some mitigations were put in place over time to communicate more directly with these audiences, but the one-size-fits-all response did not adequately address the needs of Aotearoa New Zealand’s diverse population. Many Māori and Pacific communities wanted to see their own leaders on the podium and felt this would have helped their communities to feel more engaged, which in turn would have had a positive impact on compliance, especially as the pandemic wore on and many people, particularly Aucklanders, grew tired of the focus on COVID-19.

There were also issues with the quality, speed and cultural appropriateness of some translated content, and producing it at high speed was particularly challenging. Government communications officials acknowledged this in our direct engagements, calling it a ‘pain point’.

Expected turnaround times for translated material were extremely tight; often translations were required for changes that had already been announced publicly. Sometimes the information was superseded by the time the translated material was ready. This was no fault of the often small, community-based, and sometimes volunteer organisations who were asked to produce this material. One stakeholder, whose organisation translated many government communications into accessible formats for disabled people, told us:

“My team were working all hours of day and night. We couldn’t have done anything more or differently because of the changing information and how quickly it was evolving.”

Despite these considerable efforts by many, we heard from some stakeholders that the constantly changing requirements and messages were hard to keep up with. For some communities this was exacerbated by a lack of timely, accessible information resulting in ‘information voids’ that were filled by other sources, such as word of mouth from trusted family members or unofficial online sources. In some cases, this led to people relying on inaccurate information or risked their exposure to misinformation and/or disinformation.

Spotlight: The rise of misinformation and disinformation | Te ara haere mai o ngā mōhiohio parau me te horihori

Misinformation and disinformation related to COVID-19 and the Government’s response became an increasing challenge as the pandemic wore on.

Experts told us that conditions were ripe for the spread of misinformation and disinformation going into the pandemic and that during the pandemic there was a marked increase in the volume, diversity of topics and tenor (particularly the severity of language) of disinformation circulating on topics related to COVID-19. In a study commissioned by the Classification Office during the pandemic, the majority of participants (65 percent) believed groups or organisations were intentionally spreading false or misleading information about COVID-19, and three-quarters believed false information about COVID-19 was an urgent and serious threat to New Zealand society.119

Disaffection over the introduction of vaccine mandates (and to some extent, other pandemic measures), combined with the increasing circulation of false and misleading information about the pandemic and response, from both domestic and international sources, culminated in the dramatic occupation of Parliament grounds by protesters early in 2022, perhaps the most visible expression of the pandemic’s impact on social cohesion and trust. The Chief Human Rights Commissioner viewed the decision by senior ministers and officials not to engage directly with the protestors as detrimental. Meanwhile, from the second half of 2021 at least, some senior ministers were aware of the pandemic’s increasing impact on ‘social licence’, especially the use of extended lockdowns in Auckland, but did not feel that there were viable alternatives at that time.

The characterisation of the Government as the ‘single source of truth’ also came to be seen by some as unhelpful. Early in the pandemic, the Prime Minister had used the phrase ‘single source of truth’ to emphasise that the information being conveyed from the government could be relied upon by the public, in response to a question about COVID-19-related misinformation:

“I want to send a clear message to the New Zealand public. We will share with you the most up-to-date information daily. You can trust us as a source of that information. You can also trust the director-general of health and the Ministry of Health for their information. Do feel free to visit it anytime to clarify any rumour you may hear. COVID19.govt.nz. Otherwise, dismiss anything else. We will continue to be your single source of truth. We will provide information frequently. We will share everything we can. Take everything else you see with a grain of salt.” 120

These comments were an attempt to tackle misinformation and disinformation by encouraging people to access evidence-based material available on the government website. However, the phrase was frequently quoted in submissions as something that contributed to a sense of mistrust.

“At the beginning of Covid I was very much on board with the lockdowns, but as the mandates started rolling out, followed by the vaccine pass system, and the subsequent divisions and fractures within and amongst families and people, becoming visible, and this, alongside the silencing of highly experienced voices that thought differently to the ‘one narrative for all’ and the ‘single source of truth,’ I no longer believed the government was handling Covid in a way that was not harmful.”

The damage to social cohesion and spread of misinformation and disinformation during the pandemic impacted the effectiveness of the public health response over time.121

Many stakeholders have commented that the breakdown of social cohesion that occurred during this pandemic, particularly the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation, loss of social licence for the long lockdowns in Auckland, and fractures that developed within and between communities over the mandates, will shape how the population is likely to respond to public health responses like lockdowns and vaccine requirements in any future pandemics. People told us about:

  • Impacts of misinformation and disinformation including increased vaccine hesitancy, mistrust of experts and impacts on academic freedom, harm to targeted individuals and mistrust of government.
  • Breakdown of personal, family/whānau, community and employment relationships over vaccine mandates and vaccination status.
  • Increased public anxiety, antisocial behaviour, stress and violence.
  • Anger at long lockdowns and restrictions, especially in Auckland, including a strong sense from Aucklanders that ‘Wellington’ did not understand what they had been through.
  • A sense that people would be very unwilling to comply with lockdown and vaccine requirements in a future pandemic.

The evidence from experts on some of these matters is mixed. We heard a range of opinions from researchers of misinformation and disinformation for example, who, while agreeing that disinformation had been a significant challenge and that the pandemic had exacerbated it, differed on the extent to which it presented an ongoing risk and challenge to trust and social cohesion. Some thought we had largely reverted to pre-pandemic trust levels, while others were more concerned that trust levels would continue to decline.xxiv All agreed that those who are already marginalised and with low trust in government (including Māori) are most susceptible to disinformation, and that fostering and maintaining trust and social cohesion is key to countering its impacts. Reports by multiple government agencies support a continued focus on the risk of misinformation and disinformation.122

Looking to the future, the Ombudsman suggested that increased transparency and oversight by independent integrity bodies may help take some of the ‘sting’ out of public disaffection at times of emergency powers in future.


xvii A ‘critical friend’ or red team function is a common part of strategic crisis response – bringing together a group of impartial and experienced experts, with access to data and information to enable impartial analysis to inform strategic decision-making. In this case, the team was initially set up for the purpose of an exercise of the COVID-19 testing and tracing system, but at the beginning of the August 2020 outbreak it provided a focused, accurate and dispassionate view of the initial situation. Further into the response, the scope of the Red Team’s work was redefined – it was tasked with, and provided, evidence and questions to influence strategic and operational focus and priorities.

xviii Established in August 2020 the National Response Leadership Team was made up of the Chief Executive of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Chief Executive of National Emergency Management Agency, Deputy Chief Executive in charge of the Covid-19 Group, Secretary to the Treasury and the Commissioner of Police to provide all-of-government advice to Cabinet or Covid-19 Ministers, and also to provide non-health advice to the Director-General of Health (to inform his use of powers under the Covid-19 Public Health Response Act). See Cabinet Paper and Minute, Implementing a rapid response to COVID-19 cases in the community and refinements of COVID-19 Alert Level settings, CAB-20-MIN-0387, 10 August 2020, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/SE11-Minute-and-Paper-Rapid-Response-and-Changes-to-COVID-19-Alert-Level-Settings-10-August-2020-.pdf

xix Due to increasing transmission of the Omicron variant, there were 25 changes to key COVID–19 orders between January and April 2022 – equating to a regulatory proposal every 3–4 days on average (e.g. Air Border Order, Maritime Border Order, Isolation and Quarantine Order and the Required Testing Order).

xx Albeit with much of the Bill of Rights Act advice redacted. Normal practice is for Bill of Rights Act issues within Cabinet papers to be addressed by policy departments, and to be released along with the rest of the paper. However, during the pandemic, advice on Bill of Rights Act issues was often provided by Crown Law, and was thus routinely withheld on the grounds of legal privilege.

xxi The Strategic COVID-19 Public Health Advisory Group was responsible for providing independent advice and analysis to the responsible Minister and the COVID-19 Ministerial Group on epidemiological modelling and analyses in relation to COVID-19 vaccine rollouts and any changes to the approach to public health protections and border settings.

xxii A Noting Paper sent to Cabinet establishes the new communications function, setting out its remit but it does not accord any formal responsibility for community engagement to the newly established ‘National Public Information Management Team’. Instead, it sets this out as the responsibility of individual agencies who should be carrying out this work with their own stakeholder groups.

xxiii Niche Media are an agency specialising in ethnic communications and multi-cultural marketing, and were contracted to provide cultural advice to the communications team, and helped get messages into communities, deploying advertising with iwi radio stations and also Pacific radio stations during March–April 2020.

xxiv Data from the 2023 General Social Survey found that trust held by New Zealanders in institutions like the health system, education system, Parliament, media, police and courts has declined since 2021, according to wellbeing statistics released by Stats NZ.

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