2.7 What we learned looking back Ngā akoranga i te titiro whakamuri

1. Pockets of pandemic preparedness existed at the start of 2020 which helped the initial response. However, all-of-government readiness proved insufficient for an event of the scale, impact and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Before COVID-19, a range of existing systems, legislation, plans, structures and capabilities were available to support the response. However, many turned out to be insufficient for a pandemic on the scale of COVID-19, which required a prolonged response and had widespread and complex national impacts. Many other countries found themselves in a similar position.
• The New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan, last updated in 2017, provided much useful support to the health response in the initial weeks. But, as often happens with plans, it was soon overtaken by events – in this case by factors specific to COVID-19 and the development of the elimination strategy.
• While the pre-pandemic system of risk management was useful in identifying national risks – including pandemics – there was scope for stronger oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure those risks were adequately prepared for across government.
• As happened in other countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom, Aotearoa New Zealand found the response to the COVID-19 pandemic required more integrated all-of-government coordination than the lead agency model was able to deliver. Governance changes were quickly made to recognise this, although the Inquiry was told that this took longer than desirable. Having an all-of-government model ready to go would have avoided having to develop such a structure during the busy initial response.

2. Government made hard decisions quickly under pressure but, over time, some shortcomings emerged which were not adequately addressed.

• The all-of-government structures set up in the early stages of the COVID-19 response had a clear focus on elimination. They supported the rapid delivery of this strategy which formed the basis of New Zealand’s response. Unfortunately, a separate long-term strategy function – that could sit above the fray of the day-to-day response, allow future scenarios to be considered, and deliver integrated long-term planning supporting a smooth transition across later stages of the pandemic – did not evolve.
• In the early stages of the pandemic response, it was appropriate for decisions to be made quickly with a particular focus on technical public health advice. However, over time, the process by which advice was provided (in order to incorporate the most up-to-date health information) meant fewer opportunities for non-health matters to be considered. Opportunities to consider proportionality across health, social and economic objectives were also limited.
• The emergency nature of the pandemic meant some standard policy practices were (appropriately) suspended during the early stages of the response. This included adequate opportunities for stakeholder and agency consultation, and transparent and thorough assessment of regulatory impacts. It took longer than desirable to adequately re-establish all aspects of standard policy practice.

3. Enormous efforts by public servants (supported by individuals from across communities, iwi, academia and the private sector) and the flexibility and adaptability of New Zealand’s public service enabled the rapid setup and delivery of an effective response to COVID-19.

4. Aotearoa New Zealand’s elimination strategy, and the use of public health and social measures to support it, were highly effective at stamping out pre-Delta chains of transmission when they arose and giving the country long periods without transmission.

• • The initial Alert Level System was a world-leading and innovative communication and policy tool that proved highly effective in supporting widespread compliance with public health restrictions.
  • The success of the elimination strategy relied on the coordinated effort of thousands of people around the country who supported the deployment of public health and social measures.

5. However, a determined focus to keep pursuing an elimination strategy, and a lack of strategic planning for the longer term, affected the Government’s ability to prepare for and respond to new developments and shift direction soon enough.

• Once the elimination strategy was established and demonstrated to be effective, its success resulted in less emphasis on all-of-government, long-term, strategic planning – work that could test options and scenarios on how and when to adjust or move beyond elimination, what would replace the elimination goal, and that could integrate health and social, economic and wellbeing goals.
• This reduced focus on evolving the long-term, strategic focus to guide forward direction added pressure to how the Government navigated the complexities and impacts arising from new events (such as the emergence of new variants), adapting tactics (such as moving from PCR to rapid antigen testing, removing vaccine mandates), and moving beyond, and ultimately exiting elimination (for example, the shift to caring for those with COVID-19 in the community).

6. In the early stages of the pandemic, the public communications response was highly effective and contributed to the success of the elimination response. But communications became more challenging as the pandemic wore on.

• Government messaging was initially very effective, but it became more challenging to convey messages as new settings were announced and government objectives shifted.
• Greater engagement with communities during the response could have improved the effectiveness of communications by ensuring individuals, families and communities better understood how to comply with Government directives.
• The transition out of the elimination strategy was not well signalled or communicated ahead of time. This had an unsettling impact on people, which was compounded by a rise of misinformation and disinformation (both about the virus itself and the Government response).