A.2 Emergency plans

Generic (function based) emergency management plans and specific plans for public health emergencies were in place at the start of 2020. In theory, the emergency management plans addressed all kinds of potential hazards and risks. They had been shaped largely by Aotearoa New Zealand’s history of emergencies resulting from natural hazards, which had recently included frequent flooding and two large earthquakes. Health emergency plans included the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017, the result of what the Ministry of Health called a period of ‘accelerated’ pandemic planning that had begun in 2005 when global outbreaks of new infectious diseases (such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),avian influenza (bird flu), and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) were recognised as potential threats to this country).²³ The key plans which decision-makers relied on in early 2020 are set out in the following sections.

2.1 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015²⁴

Section 39 of Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 provides for the development of a National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan by Order in Council.

This plan sets out the hazards and risk to be managed at a national level. At its broadest level the plan sets out how the civil defence emergency management sector will coordinate in a national emergency. The plan is supported by a detailed guide setting out the arrangements, roles and responsibilities of agencies involved in the national management of emergencies, or supporting local management. They include the National Emergency Management Agency, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, Police and the Defence Force, health and disability services, lifeline utilities and others.

Consistent with the ‘all-hazards, all-risks approach’ to emergency management which Aotearoa New Zealand adopted in 2002, the plan applies regardless of the hazard or threat causing the emergency. It lists eighteen hazards and risks that ‘either singularly or in combination, have the potential to cause emergencies that may require coordination or management at the national level’ – including ‘infectious human disease pandemics’.²⁵

The plan also addresses the responsibilities of government departments and other organisations in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 in an emergency, in addition to whatever hazard-related activities their own legislation might require of them. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 requires departments and other organisations to ensure business continuity by ‘functioning to the fullest extent possible during and after an emergency to meet their statutory responsibilities’.^xvi

The plan also described the crisis management responsibilities of the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) and the National Security Committee^xvii – the groups responsible for governance and decision-making within central government – and the lead agencies mandated to head emergency responses. Which agency leads the response is determined by the nature of the emergency itself. The plan names the Ministry of Health as the lead agency in the event of a pandemic.

2.2 National Health Emergency Plan (2015)²⁶

The Ministry of Health developed this plan as a strategic framework to guide the health and disability sector ‘in its approach to planning for, responding to and recovering from health-related risks and consequences of significant hazards in New Zealand’. When it was released in 2015, it was seen as an important step in the ongoing development of the sector’s emergency management capability and capacity. It was supported by several guidance documents and actions, which in 2020 included the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017 (described in section 2.3).

Echoing the language of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act, the plan addressed the sector’s role in leading or supporting the ‘4 Rs’ of emergency management: reduction of risks, readiness, response and recovery. The specific risks it focused on were the same as those identified in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan and the National Hazardscape Report (2007),²⁷ including pandemics. The plan defined and described the Ministry of Health’s all-of-government coordination role as the national lead agency in such emergencies. It also set out a formal structure for liaison between the Ministry, district health boards, and national and local response agencies in emergencies.

2.3 New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017²⁸

This was Aotearoa New Zealand’s sole pandemic-specific response plan at the time COVID-19 emerged, and it served as the guiding document in the first weeks of the response. It set out the all-of-government measures to be taken before, during and after a pandemic in order ‘to protect New Zealand’s people, society and economy’. While focused explicitly on an influenza pandemic – considered at the time to be the most likely event to cause a large-scale public health emergency – the approach underpinning the plan was said to be applicable to ‘other respiratory-type pandemics’ whether mild or severe.

The plan focused on containing or suppressing infection, although it also referred to social and economic goals. It described an influenza pandemic consisting of six sequential phases, which the country would move between according to changes in cases and transmission rates: ‘Plan for it’, ‘Keep it out’, ‘Stamp it out’, ‘Manage it’, ‘Manage it: Post-Peak’ and ‘Recover from it’. The plan specified public health measures and other actions to be taken in each phase. As with most countries’ pre-COVID-19 pandemic plans, the approach taken in the Influenza Pandemic Plan was consistent with guidance from the World Health Organization’s 2017 Pandemic Influenza Risk Management document.²⁹

A large part of the Influenza Pandemic Plan was devoted to describing key public agencies and their responsibilities in a pandemic response. It emphasised the importance of regular inter-agency exercises and training to test the plan, to integrate the efforts of individual agencies, and to ensure staff could function effectively in an emergency (see section 3.4 for more on these exercises).

The plan noted the very significant impact of the 1918 influenza pandemic on Māori (who died at between five and seven times the rate of non-Māori) as well as the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, which hit both Māori and Pacific people very hard.³⁰ The plan emphasised the need for effective communication of key messages to Māori and Pacific communities, the inclusion of Māori in district, regional and national pandemic planning, and other forms of ‘active engagement’.³¹ District health boards were also urged to engage with Māori and Pacific communities in their regions to understand their priorities. The plan noted that ‘Māori communities often [had] important resources to contribute in terms of health emergency planning for a pandemic’.³² It did not refer to te Tiriti o Waitangi or address the Crown’s te Tiriti obligations in a future pandemic response.