11.3 In brief: what the recommendations say

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The 39 recommendations set out in the definitive table of recommendations at the end of this chapter call for action across many areas of government (see section 11.4). All support a common overall objective: ensuring pandemic preparations and the response itself have a clear purpose and are people-centred.

As we commented in our lessons for the future (Chapter 10), such an objective should be adopted and regularly articulated throughout any pandemic response. Doing so will give the Government and the people of Aotearoa New Zealand a clear sense of direction, a benchmark against which response decisions can be measured and decision-makers held accountable, and a lodestar when the going gets especially tough.

Our recommendations are organised into six groups. The broad intention behind each group is described below.

Group 1: Strengthen all-of-government coordination and accountability for pandemic preparedness | Rōpū 1: Te whakakaha i te whakariterite o te kāwanatanga whānui me te noho haepapa mō te takatū mō te mate urutā

This first group of recommendations aims to strengthen the coordination of, and accountability for, all-of-government pandemic preparedness. Our analysis of the response to COVID-19 showed that Aotearoa New Zealand – like many other countries – would benefit from stronger assessment of the risks posed by a future pandemic (and potentially other national risks), and stronger coordination of government preparedness to mitigate that risk.

The scale, complexity and duration of COVID-19 reinforced the need for all-of-government coordination of and support for pandemic preparedness and response. We therefore recommend that a specific function be established within a central agency to carry out this role. The term ‘central agency function’ is used because, while it is clearly a function that needs to be carried out by a central agency in government (with assistance from other agencies), we see the breadth and capacity of this function as extending beyond the role of any one existing agency. Something new and expanded is needed. Its functions should include considering the risks posed by a future pandemic (using tools such as scenario planning), evaluating potential options for mitigating those risks, supporting cross-agency preparations for a pandemic response and coordinating pandemic response exercises.

This new centralised function needs to be supported by relevant expertise and capacity. Both scenario planning and modelling (not only epidemiological modelling, but also health, social and economic) should be routinely used to support decision-making, planning and all other preparedness activities. So too should specialist advice on issues including safeguarding human rights and democratic principles in a pandemic response, and the Crown’s te Tiriti obligations. External expertise should also inform pandemic preparations and response.

As we set out in Chapter 2, the risk management system in place ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic had limitations. In particular, it had few formal oversight or accountability mechanisms for ensuring adequate planning and preparation was underway across government. As was the case in many countries, Aotearoa New Zealand’s risk management system lacked real ‘bite’ – a factor that we consider affected national preparedness for an event of the scale, duration and complexity of COVID-19.

This group of recommendations also therefore sets out how the Government can ensure stronger oversight and accountability for the preparation for pandemics and other national risks. As we conducted the Inquiry, it became clear that it would be both illogical and inefficient to consider pandemics in isolation from other national risks. Evidence presented to us reinforced the need for a broad approach. Our recommendations therefore situate pandemics within the broader context of national risks. We recommend actions that will improve oversight at many levels – by Parliament, at the all-of-government level, by the public sector collectively and within government agencies. Their scrutiny should include what actions are being taken to address national risks and how gaps in preparedness are being addressed.

Group 1 recommendations at a glance

Strengthen all-of-government coordination and accountability for pandemic preparedness.

Establish a central agency function to coordinate all-of-government preparation and response planning for pandemics and other national risks, supported by strengthened scenario planning, modelling capability, and external expertise.
Strengthen oversight and accountability for pandemic preparedness, and make it more publicly transparent, with preparedness being sustainably funded.

Group 2: Ensure an all-of-government pandemic plan, response structure and supporting processes are developed and ready for a pandemic response | Rōpū 2: Te whakarite ka hangaia tētahi mahere mate urutā, anga urupare me ngā hātepe tautoko i te kāwanatanga whānui, ā, e rite ana mō tētahi urupare mate urutā

An all-of-government pandemic plan is an essential element of a coordinated and effective response. It should integrate the individual response plans prepared by sector groups (for example, justice or social sector agencies) and also align closely with the pandemic plan produced by the Ministry of Health, the agency with core competency in public health emergencies.

We saw early on in the response to COVID-19 that the pre-existing ‘lead agency’ model, supported by Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC), was not adequate for the scale of the pandemic. An all-of-government response structure was needed. While arrangements were quickly established, they had to be modified several times during 2020. Things might have been different if an all-of-government response structure had been developed and practised in advance. To ensure the all-of-government approach works effectively, there should be processes in place to quickly secure adequate staffing and rotate staff to prevent burnout. Processes for developing advice under urgency, while still taking account of critical considerations such as human rights issues, are also needed. Strengthening decision-making will be particularly important in relation to public health measures, like lockdowns and vaccine mandates, which involve careful weighing of competing considerations.

Group 2 recommendations at a glance

Ensure an all-of-government pandemic plan, response structure and supporting processes are developed and ready for a pandemic response.

Develop and regularly practise an all-of-government response plan for a pandemic, covering the national-level response and integrating sector-specific plans.
Ensure an all-of-government response structure is ready to be activated if needed in a pandemic, supported by adequate staffing and the provision of comprehensive advice under urgency.

Group 3: Strengthen the public health measures that may be required in a pandemic | Rōpū 3: Te whakakaha i ngā whakaritenga hauora tūmatanui ka hiahiatia pea i tētahi mate urutā

The Influenza Pandemic Plan that Aotearoa New Zealand had before COVID-19 had some useful elements but was inadequate for COVID-19. A more comprehensive pandemic plan is needed for the health system that sets out how public health measures can be used to respond to a range of pandemic scenarios. The Ministry of Health has developed a health system pandemic plan since the COVID-19 pandemic, and we make recommendations for how this should be refined. These refinements include plans for health communication, which is critical in any pandemic.

There is a core set of public health measures that need to be part of the available toolkit given the range of potential pandemic scenarios. Along with the health sector pandemic plan, specific plans should be made for how this set of public health measures can be rapidly implemented and scaled-up as required. These include quarantine and isolation, national or regional lockdowns, testing, contact tracing, border restrictions and vaccination.

Lockdowns are measures of last resort, and our view is that with better preparation of other core tools, the likelihood that they will be needed again can be reduced. However, they should stay as part of the toolkit, as a scenario involving a virus that is even more infectious or deadly than the COVID-19 virus is possible; even with good preparation and a good policy response we may still need to reach for lockdowns. Government-issued occupational vaccination requirements should similarly stay in the toolbox, though the bar for their use should be very high. Employer-set vaccination policies for staff under occupational safety and health legislation should only be used with caution, with good information available to employers and employees on the likely benefits and harms. Vaccination certificates or passes – for example, for incoming travellers – cannot be ruled out either, but should only be used when the marginal benefits relative to other policy responses such as mask wearing outweigh the potential harms.

Our groups of recommendations work together. Good decision-making about when to use lockdowns and vaccination requirements will be strengthened by recommendations in Group 2. The recommendations in Group 3 and Group 4 then strengthen our ability to use such tools in a way that minimises their negative consequences, when it is decided they are needed.

Group 3 recommendations at a glance

Strengthen the public health measures that may be required in a pandemic.

The Ministry of Health should refine the health system pandemic plan and link it with the all-of-government pandemic plan.
Plans in place for scaling-up and implementing significant public health measures in a pandemic.

Group 4: Ensure all sectors are prepared for a pandemic and are ready to respond | Rōpū 4: Te whakarite kei te takatū ngā rāngai katoa mō tētahi mate urutā, ā, e rite ana ki te urupare

The COVID-19 pandemic and associated response measures impacted all sectors and parts of society over a prolonged period, to a degree that had not been anticipated. Wide ranging impacts are inevitable in a future pandemic too, given the interconnectedness of our economic, social, health and government systems, and the range of possible responses that might be needed. This group of recommendations is aimed at lessening the breadth, severity and duration of those impacts to the greatest extent possible next time.

Aotearoa New Zealand has learned that being prepared for a pandemic is not just a matter for the emergency management system, or for the health system, the responsibility falls on all sectors to be ready to respond and remain resilient, for however long the response is needed. We therefore recommend that each sector has its own pandemic plan which aligns with the overall all-of-government pandemic plan.

Agencies must invest in and maintain working relationships and partnerships with a broad range of stakeholders in their sectors. They should seek to develop a shared understanding of the likely impacts of another pandemic and what preparations are required. Regional and international relationships that will be beneficial next time (for example, by ensuring access to vaccines and essential products like personal protective equipment (PPE)) should also be fostered.

We also include specific recommendations for the health, economic, social, education and justice sectors. For each, we set out how these sectors can prepare and build the resilience needed to keep necessary goods and services going as efficiently as possible in a pandemic and beyond.

In the health system, we recommend taking steps to strengthen its resilience and readiness to deal with the multiple demands of a national pandemic: it needs access to a greater capacity to treat a possible surge in pandemic-related illness without compromising non-pandemic health and disability services. We also recommend that health and other agencies investigate ways to improve ventilation and airflow in buildings which we now know play a significant role in limiting the transmission of respiratory viruses.

In other sectors, we make recommendations aimed at ensuring they can play their role in responding to a pandemic. These include minimising disruption to supply chains, making sure that households have sufficient income and food security, and ensuring access to services like courts and education is maintained as much as possible.

Group 4 recommendations at a glance

Ensure all sectors are prepared for a pandemic and are ready to respond.

- Ensure each sector has a pandemic plan and consider what they would need to do to support activity within their sector to keep going safely in a pandemic.
- Ensure the health, economic, social, education and justice sectors are prepared to keep necessary goods and services going as much as possible in a pandemic, without compromising the long-term capability to continue delivering these services in the future.

Group 5: Ensure enablers are in place | Rōpū 5: Te whakarite kua rite ngā kaihāpai

This group of recommendations focuses on the enablers that must be in place to underpin any future pandemic response. Government agencies and appropriate iwi and Māori organisations should review successful examples of Crown-Māori partnerships in the COVID-19 response – some of which are documented throughout this report – and make any changes that will embed te Tiriti relationships, frameworks and partnerships in a future pandemic response.

It is also essential that fit-for-purpose legislation is in place, and that all agencies have the core infrastructure they need to carry out their role in any pandemic response.

Group 5 recommendations at a glance

Ensure enablers are in place.

Improve the way public sector agencies work with iwi and Māori during a pandemic to support the Crown in its relationship with Māori under te Tiriti.
Review legislation to ensure it is fit for purpose for a future pandemic.
Ensure core infrastructure is fit for purpose to support each sector’s pandemic response.

Group 6: Implement these recommendations | Rōpū 6: Whakatinanahia ēnei tūtohutanga

Almost two years have passed since the COVID-19 pandemic response formally ended, and the risk of a future pandemic remains high. While this Inquiry will not be complete until the Phase Two report is presented in early 2026, the lessons and recommendations in this Phase One report have been drafted with an eye to their immediate applicability and implementation.

We therefore recommend that a minister should be appointed to lead the response to, and implementation of, the Phase One recommendations. Responsible agencies should report to this minister every six months on their progress towards implementing the recommendations, and a report summarising all agencies’ progress should be tabled in Parliament within 12 months of the Phase One report being released.

Group 6 recommendations at a glance

Implement these recommendations

Consider and implement Phase One recommendations as soon as practicable.