6.4 What happened: social sector impacts and responses I aha: Ngā pānga me ngā urupare a te rāngai pāpori

6.4.1 What happened

As we set out earlier in this report, some acute social problems were already confronting Aotearoa New Zealand before the pandemic. They ranged from an ongoing housing crisis, hardship for families in low-income households and on benefit support, growing mental health issues, and the long-standing inequalities or inequities faced by Māori, and a range of other groups. A significant proportion of the population was experiencing persistent disadvantage.⁶²

For individuals, families and communities facing hardships like these, social services provide a much-needed safety net. During a pandemic, they also play a critical role in minimising the spread of infection. The availability of social services means people can comply with health measures, including staying home safely, while still having their basic needs met.

Pre-pandemic, 697,000 New Zealanders (more than 15 percent of the population) were estimated to be experiencing persistent disadvantage.⁶³

International disaster literature, along with lessons from New Zealand disasters including the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes, shows that certain groups are disproportionately impacted during natural disasters and other crises: namely, groups already facing existing disadvantage.⁶⁴ That was well known at the start of the pandemic and, looking back from 2024, we can see this is largely what occurred.

During the pandemic, the need for various forms of social support and services increased. They included:⁶⁵

• Food grants and parcels.
• Housing support and emergency housing.
• Family violence support (including refuge, food and other supports).
• Community-based mental health and addiction support.
• Support with meeting basic needs (including blankets, clothing, cleaning supplies, heating and devices/wifi).
• Support for individuals or families to isolate.

In normal times, responsibility for designing, funding and delivering social supports is spread across many organisations. The Ministry of Social Development is often seen as the lead government agency, but many others are also involved.^xiv During a crisis, the Civil Defence Emergency Management system also has welfare support responsibilities. And while some supports are delivered directly from agencies (such as income support and statutory care and protection), most are delivered through a network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social service providers and charities. Local government and philanthropic funders also have key roles.

6.4.1.1 Investment in social services and supports

Mitigating the pandemic’s potential social and wellbeing impacts was a significant component of the COVID-19 response from the start. The initial Government COVID-19 spending package Cabinet agreed to on 26 March 2020 included funding to ‘ensure people have access to the food and other goods they need to survive’ and ‘services that provide a place for people to live’ during the first national lockdown.⁶⁶ Specific funding was tagged for disabled people, family violence and sexual violence, local community solutions, and for Māori and Pacific peoples. In addition, funding was provided through Te Puni Kōkiri to boost Whānau Ora^xv and launch a new fund to support whānau, communities, marae and businesses with self-isolation and accessing the essential support needed to remain connected to their communities.⁶⁷

By the second day of the first lockdown, $27 million of targeted social relief funding had been approved.⁶⁸ This was increased substantially in May when Budget 2020 earmarked $2.9 billion for COVID-19-related social spending, including a permanent $25 per week benefit increase^xvi and a temporary doubling of the Winter Energy Payment (intended to help people with the cost of heating their homes).⁶⁹

As 2020 turned into 2021, and it became increasingly clear that COVID-19 was no short-term blip, there was growing recognition of the scale of the investment required for a sustained social sector response matched to community needs.⁷⁰ Significant further investment in social services was made in 2022; even though community transmission had become well-established since the arrival of the Delta and Omicron variants, supporting people to isolate safely at home when infected or vulnerable to infection remained critical for the overall success of the COVID-19 response.

Starting from March 2020 and including budget allocation up to the end of June 2023, we estimate that total COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund expenditure on social response included $2.4 billion used to support community responses, $3.3 billion in additional benefits to individuals and households, and $18 billion to support the Wage Subsidy Scheme.^xvii Delivering this response involved an exceptional amount of work delivered under heavy pressure and amid rapid change. We acknowledge the collaboration and effort this involved across the entire sector and in local communities.

6.4.1.2 Delivering social services and support during the pandemic

Coordinating and planning the response

For Government, setting up the range of social services and supports needed to get people through a pandemic, and then communicating the expectations and rules, was very challenging – especially as it had to be done rapidly. Much was achieved in a short period, largely by changing the way supports and services were managed within government and delivered on the ground by providers and community organisations.

The initial response (from March 2020) was patchy and focused on immediate priorities. Most government agencies relaxed the reporting requirements on existing social service and community contracts. The types of support most likely to be needed, and the groups likely to be impacted by the pandemic, were already known.⁷¹ How agencies and the wider sector planned to deliver against these needs and the other demands of the COVID-19 response was less clear.

While there was little evidence of pandemic planning at a social sector level, some agencies, including the Ministry of Social Development, had specific plans for their agency. The Ministry told us that its early responses were guided by the existing New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017 and recent regional incidents – the Whakaari/White Island eruption, the Northland drought, floods in Southland and the response to the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes.

Oranga Tamariki had earlier rolled out a new digital platform (completed in February 2020) that enabled frontline staff to switch to remote working and reporting. While this was lucky timing, it was also an important preparation that enabled continuity of essential services (including social work support for children in care) during the pandemic.⁷²

Shifting to a collaborative approach

After the first few months, the overall social sector response was characterised by high agility, flexibility and collaboration between government, iwi and community partners – accompanied by an injection of (mostly time-limited) funding. Throughout this period, some cracks were exposed in coordination and approach; for example, instances of different agencies contracting to the same provider for different pieces of pandemic support but taking different contracting approaches.

At the same time, it was realised the response would need to be sustained for an as-yet unknown length of time: months and perhaps even years. In response, the Ministry of Social Development, the lead agency in the sector, changed its operating model significantly to make it easier for people to access support. The change also allowed the Ministry to free up staff to work on new initiatives, including the Wage Subsidy Scheme. It was a ‘rapid and near-total overhaul’, one senior official told us, and necessary for two reasons: it would allow the Ministry to keep delivering ‘business as usual’ support under lockdown conditions, and also allow the rapid development and delivery of new supports.

The Ministry of Social Development relaxed many of its standard processes, thresholds, and stand-down times for income support; expanded access to some benefit types, including temporary food grants; and switched from in-person to remote and online service delivery. Along with other government agencies, the Ministry contracted non-governmental organisations to deliver additional social services and support, relaxed many of its compliance requirements, and notified providers that funding would not be held back against existing contracts due to the pandemic. We heard many of the changes made were both effective and appreciated by the clients in the system.

Agencies also adopted new commissioning models which gave greater emphasis to partnering with local providers, and relied on high-trust relationships between agencies and providers.⁷³ The agencies recognised there was simply no time to develop and negotiate traditional output-based contracts for the services and supports needed across the country – which, in normal times, would see agencies assess needs and specify the volume and type of services the provider would deliver in each period.⁷⁴ Under the commissioning model, after the relevant agency and service providers had jointly agreed on the desired outcomes, providers were largely left to determine what services would be provided and how, as circumstances evolved. Commissioning relies on high-trust relationships between agencies and providers.

“During COVID, we worked with regional teams to ensure they had the right relationships to be able to work with the right people for a community response.”

We heard from many government and community organisations that there was great value in developing these relationships in advance – as a way of both improving commissioning and service delivery in the present, and setting the foundation needed to respond to a future crisis.

With relational commissioning, accountability shifted from documentation of compliance with specific outputs to less onerous accountability. This still provided assurance to Government but gave providers flexibility to adjust how to best fulfil the contract. Government agencies also made changes in governance and coordination, and these are discussed in section 6.4.1.3.

Local responses

COVID-19 social responses were not only directed from central government agencies – they also involved coordinated efforts by thousands of people around the country. Working together, individuals, whānau, hapū, iwi, NGOs, councils, faith communities, agencies and businesses – including many volunteers – ensured the health and wellbeing of their clients, their own people and communities.

“On the ground, it was community-led responses and action that ensured people and whānau had what they needed to get through the rāhui and stop the spread of COVID-19.”⁷⁵

There was some confusion at the start of the pandemic about what services were essential (see discussion in Chapter 3) and how multiple providers supporting the same communities should work together. But as time went on, the sector became more confident in how it could best support their communities. In some cases, that meant providers delivering services without contracts or funding, using their own resources, until the government systems caught up. One provider of money management services for people who cannot get bank accounts told us that, before COVID-19, they used paper-based systems. ‘All of a sudden, we couldn’t pay these people the money they live on each week because the bank closed, and these people didn’t have bank accounts [to do internet banking]. We found workarounds – e.g. running to various cash machines with organisational credit cards getting out the maximum limit.’

Funding from charitable donations and philanthropy also contributed to the COVID-19 response. New Zealand Red Cross told us that support from donors and corporate partners contributed to their COVID-19 response such as the production of New Zealand Red Cross care parcels distributed to vulnerable families.

One factor that made local service providers so effective in the pandemic response was their well-established and trusted relationships with local communities and families – which, in turn, gave them a deep understanding of the issues facing individual households. While social sector agencies hold data at an aggregate level on the needs of citizens, this is not the same as the intelligence held by on-the-ground providers who know their community’s needs first-hand. Many providers we met with told us how the shift to more flexible contracts with Government gave them the room they needed to identify and best support the needs presenting in their communities, using their local knowledge of their clients and communities to provide tailored support.

We also heard that whānau-centred service delivery and support through Whānau Ora formed a bedrock for Māori communities during the pandemic. The flexible arrangements government agencies put in place allowed Māori to deliver the support whānau needed, based on manaakitanga, trust and connections. We talked to many commentators from government and community organisations who specifically mentioned the excellent support that Māori communities and service providers delivered. They knew their communities well and were expert in programmes and support that were Māori-designed, developed and delivered.⁷⁶

“Iwi understanding of their communities informed the effective distribution of welfare support, including placement of Community Connectors within their regions.”⁷⁷

“Tangata whenua were absolutely superb. Their inclusiveness, the way that they came around the community, distributing fish – so many different things that were so positive.”

As we describe in Chapter 3, in relation to lockdowns specifically, iwi and Māori stepped up to lead and deliver many forms of essential social support during the pandemic response. In many rohe, marae became community service hubs.

Local Māori and non-Māori came to marae for food distribution, wifi, testing and vaccinations. In some rural and remote areas, iwi and Māori also helped people access generators and water. According to the Ministry of Health, ‘iwi, hapū and marae became centres of excellence for responding to the pandemic’. It was a similar story in many other communities, where places like sports clubs, churches and health centres became de facto social service hubs. We also heard about the importance of schools as hubs, especially in rural areas, and the important leadership role school principals played in the wider community. Similarly, Pacific church leaders generally played a strong role in supporting their communities and advocating Pacific peoples’ needs during the pandemic. Government agencies partnered with communities and local providers to deliver support.

The shift by government agencies to new commissioning models^xviii was also critical in enabling effective local responses. The commissioning gave greater emphasis to partnering with local providers and strengthening provider networks in different regions. This was particularly important in rural areas where there are usually fewer providers. With the need to get funding and support out to communities fast, agencies recognised they needed to leverage local knowledge so that emerging needs could be identified, and then enable local providers to assess and deliver services matched to those needs. According to several agencies we spoke to, and the many providers and community organisations involved in the delivery, this was a much better way of responding to community needs during the pandemic. It had similarities with the Whānau Ora delivery model, which empowers Māori and Pacific providers to develop and deliver services tailored to the unique needs of their communities.

During our Inquiry, we heard many success stories where groups in the community came together to address local needs and shape the pandemic response on the ground. A compilation of case studies of community action during 2020 noted the best outcomes were achieved in communities where the strongest existing relationships were already in place.⁷⁸

“[T]he experiences of how community-based social service organisations adapted and responded during the COVID-19 lockdowns and alert levels showed the challenges of the current system and offered opportunities for change. Innovation occurred, ensuring communities and hapori were kept safe.”

There were also opportunities to improve the social response. We heard of instances where multiple organisations were providing wrap-around services in the same community, leading to some duplication – particularly of food parcels. In a few cases, families used food parcels to barter for cash to cover other bills. We also heard of some challenges arising when agencies and local providers were working out new relationships and systems during the pandemic. Overall, the evidence we received suggested a high degree of integrity in the response, in terms of the assistance reaching the people who needed it. In fact, we heard many cases where providers used their own reserves to support their community, beyond the funding received from Government.

Overall, central government enabled successful locally-led responses by means of clear messaging and expectations, a strong sense of shared purpose, empowering people to work differently and adequate resourcing. Throughout our Inquiry, we regularly heard government and community stakeholders reflect positively on what the recalibrated approach to social service provision had achieved, and many thought continuing this approach beyond the pandemic response would be beneficial. We heard that the change from contracting to commissioning, and the different accountability mechanisms that were adopted during the pandemic, were well managed by agencies and supported efficient delivery against outcomes.

Flexible ways of delivering support were adopted

The delivery of food parcels to people stuck at home was one of the most visible forms of social support during the pandemic, especially when lockdowns were in force. Food parcels were often accompanied by hygiene packs containing hand sanitizers, medicines, masks and cleaning supplies. Delivery of such essentials meant COVID-19-positive families could stay at home in their bubbles, thereby reducing community transmission. These deliveries were particularly important to families living in poverty, people who had suddenly become unemployed, and to older or immuno-compromised people. They also gave many providers an opportunity to assess the wider situation – who was in the household, what were their needs and whether there were any issues needing action.

Other forms of social service delivery also played an important role in the pandemic response. Online delivery of some services – such as those for youth transitioning out of care, mothers dealing with high-needs children, women and children at risk of family violence, and people receiving support for mental health issues or addiction – became a new tool. However online services only worked when the people using them had devices and internet connections, so those things often had to be provided too. As well as online check-ins and meetings, many providers found innovative ways to support their clients, such as making short videos about key points or techniques they would normally share in face-to-face sessions.

But not all services could pivot to online support. For example, care for disabled and elderly people still had to be provided in-person, and workers depended on the availability and coordination of PPE to be safe. Often the community sector could not get access to PPE, restricting providers’ ability to provide safe services to high needs clients (the procurement and distribution of PPE is covered in Chapter 5).

The pandemic also led to many health and social services becoming integrated. This saw social service providers coordinating community pop-up testing and mobile door-to-door testing, making pharmacy deliveries and organising local mask distribution. The integration of services was also visible at vaccination events, which sometimes involved non-medical staff who had been trained as vaccinators. The success of community hubs, including marae, is another example of the integration and coordination of the wider needs of the community.

6.4.1.3 New ways of working within government

Government social sector agencies improved their governance and coordination

As it became apparent the pandemic was going to need a longer and more sustained response, many government agencies adapted their governance arrangements for the new environment. There were some changes in how government agencies worked together across traditional siloes and took on more of an oversight role across the whole social sector system.

For example, the ‘Caring for Communities’^xix workstream operated at a regional level. In 16 regions, it brought together the local Civil Defence Emergency Management groups with regional leaders from government agencies and local government to guide and support community planning and response activity. This activity was supported by a chief executive group, whose members were drawn from social sector government agencies and chaired by the Ministry of Social Development. The chief executive group helped ensure rapid and coordinated decision-making and allocation of resources from the centre. It used agencies’ various networks of providers to get better collective service cover, and quickly resolved barriers and challenges identified.

Another move to improve coordination and collaboration among agencies was the strengthening of the Regional Public Service Leadership model. It had been agreed in June 2019;⁸⁶ initial appointments to these positions were made in late 2019 and the first half of 2020. The overall model seeks to strengthen coordination between central agencies and regional counterparts. Designated Regional Public Service Leads were active in the initial COVID-19 response. In July 2021, Government changed their titles to Regional Public Service Commissioners and expanded their scope and mandate.⁸⁷ The Commissioners were intended to be conduits for all government agencies into regions. They sought to bridge regional connections and play a part in identifying, resolving or referring on local and regional issues with iwi, Māori, local government, Pacific and other community leaders. While part of the ‘Caring for Communities’ regional groups, the Commissioners’ mandate went beyond social support to include education, training and economic development. In November 2021, they were mandated ‘with leading the regional alignment and coordination of the public service contribution’ to the COVID-19 Protection Framework, including the welfare approach.⁸⁸

As of 2024, the Regional Public Service Commissioner model is still maturing. As expected with a new initiative like this, we heard of some variability in the way it has been applied across regions. But we believe the model is a promising one that may, in future, support better coordination between local preparedness planning and welfare responses managed by central government agencies.

The Care in the Community welfare response formalised the new approach

In the early phases of the pandemic, central government agencies and the network of groups delivering welfare services on the ground all had much to learn about how best to support the community. In November 2021, anticipating a pivot to ‘living with the virus’, some of the best practices to date were incorporated into the Care in the Community health and welfare response.⁸⁹

It was a package of supports – including health monitoring, food and non-food essentials – for individuals and whānau who contracted COVID-19 and needed to isolate at home. A coordinated approach was used to assess and triage people’s welfare needs, make referrals, and ensure they could access virtual consultations with pharmacists and other health professionals, medications such as antivirals, and other forms of health and welfare support.⁹⁰

The initial funding of $204 million included resourcing for Community Connectors to support the welfare needs of individuals and whānau so they could isolate safely, including connecting them to services during and when moving out of self-isolation.⁹¹ The Cabinet paper seeking funding noted that Care in the Community would deliver a ‘regionally-enabled and locally-led welfare approach that can respond effectively to people in self-isolation’.⁹²

While Care in the Community was primarily intended for those managing their illness and isolating at home, providers could take a flexible approach to what was provided and to whom. Some of the community needs they ended up addressing went beyond self-isolation support. In these cases, after addressing immediate priorities, the Community Connectors and providers focused on linking people to support that could strengthen their independence and protect them against the pandemic’s long-term financial, education and wellbeing impacts.⁹³

Care in the Community was implemented by Regional Leadership Groups, Regional Public Service Commissioners and Ministry of Social Development Regional Commissioners, working in partnership with community providers and leaders, iwi, Māori, Pacific peoples, ethnic communities, the disability sector, local councils and government agencies. The Ministry of Social Development set up a COVID-19 welfare helpline, national and regional triaging teams, and new IT supports to share information and referrals. It also undertook a real-time evaluation to generate rapid insights and lessons from Care in the Community.⁹⁴

Based on the evidence we reviewed, we think Care in the Community is another initiative that offers a model that should be used in future pandemics, may have utility in other crises, and has lessons for service provision in non-emergency times.

Some challenges remain unresolved

As we have seen in the preceding sections, government agencies made rapid changes to internal operating models, the contracting and commissioning of services, and how they worked together and with providers and communities. All these moves made a positive impact, chiefly by letting local providers rapidly deliver tailored support and services to the communities they worked in. However, several issues were raised in our engagements that may warrant further consideration.

We heard from agencies, providers and local government that the response was complicated by a lack of clarity about social service roles and responsibilities within government agencies during a pandemic. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan provides for a welfare response that is separate from the local ‘business as usual’ social services provision. We were told that the Civil Defence approach may be appropriate in some disaster events. But a pandemic, which will usually require a longer response, needs a different approach – one that leverages existing relationships and knowledge.

Many groups told us that while some of the pandemic’s impacts on individuals and groups – particularly those already identified as vulnerable – were predictable, the funding Government provided to mitigate them was inadequate. While agencies worked hard to disperse the funding that was available, they said vulnerable groups and communities were nonetheless disproportionately affected by the pandemic. For example:

• Ethnic communities were grateful for the funding they eventually received, even though it came very late. Many also expressed appreciation for the support given by the Ministry for Ethnic Communities.
• Advocates for women pointed to the considerable economic burden the pandemic placed on women, including being over-represented in sectors with greatest job loss, but the COVID-19 recovery package focused on male-dominated sectors like construction and trades.

Finally, many community groups and providers raised specific concerns about the vaccination rollout, such as the Ministry of Health not engaging with local groups early on, or the fact that some vaccine providers used government funding to provide cash vouchers as incentives to be vaccinated. These and other vaccination issues are covered in Chapter 7.

We heard from agencies, providers and local government that the response was complicated by a lack of clarity about social service roles and responsibilities within government agencies during a pandemic.